The Precedential Force of Panel Law by Kannan, Phillip M.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 76
Issue 4 Summer 1993 Article 4
The Precedential Force of Panel Law
Phillip M. Kannan
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Phillip M. Kannan, The Precedential Force of Panel Law, 76 Marq. L. Rev. 755 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol76/iss4/4
THE PRECEDENTIAL FORCE
OF PANEL LAW
PHILLIP M. KANNAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal courts of appeals are authorized by statute to hear and deter-
mine cases by panels as well as en banc.1 In 1992, 6851 three-judge panels
were possible from court of appeals judges alone.2 The number of possible
panels ranged from twenty in the First Circuit to 3276 in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.3 The number of possible panels would have increased substantially if
district judges were included.4 Panels perform almost all of the appellate
work in the federal judicial system;5 yet, as explained below, they lack a full
range of judicial power and an adequate precedential system to fulfill this
responsibility effectively.
No statute defines the precedential force of each panel's decision on sub-
sequent panels of the same circuit. Intracourt comity, the model followed
by district courts, could have been adopted by the courts of appeals.' In-
stead, all thirteen circuits, with the possible exception of the Seventh Cir-
cuit, have developed the interpanel doctrine: No panel can overrule the
precedent established by any panel in the same circuit; all panels are bound
* B.A. 1961, University of North Carolina; M.A. 1963, University of North Carolina; J.D.
1974, University of Tennessee. The views expressed here are solely those of the author.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1988). "En bane" and "in banc" are both correct spellings for the same
term. Although some sources, including the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, use "in bane,"
most courts prefer "en bane." In this Article, "en bane" will be used unless spelled otherwise by
the source quoted.
Panels usually consist of three circuit judges, or two such judges and one district judge. An en
bane court for a circuit generally consists of all the circuit judges in regular active service in that
circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988).
2. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 881 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J., concurring), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).
3. Id.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1988).
5. FED. R. Arp. P. 35(a) (An en banc "hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will
not be ordered."); see also Gonzales v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 772 F.2d 637, 641 (5th Cir.
1985) (stating that en banc consideration is an extraordinary procedure)
6. See, e.g., United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (stating that under
the doctrine of intracourt comity, judges of coordinate jurisdiction within a jurisdiction should
follow rulings of other such judges except in unusual or exceptional circumstances), aff'd sub norm
United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982). Such precedent is not binding.
See, eg., Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1000-01 (D. Minn. 1981), affid, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th
Cir. 1982), and affld, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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by prior panel decisions in the same circuit.7 In the Seventh Circuit, the
rule is implied from the practice of circulating, to all active judges of the
court, panel decisions that reverse precedent. 8
The decisions applying the interpanel rule have not clearly articulated
their legal bases. The rule is apparently based on the assumption that
panels have no judicial power or jurisdiction to overrule panel precedent.9
This assumption, in turn, seems based on an implication that, because the
courts en banc have retained the authority to overrule panel precedent, 10
panels have no such authority. That rationale, however, is questionable be-
cause en banc courts retain a full set of judicial power, but only this one
facet is denied panels.
Another possible basis for the interpanel rule is Federal Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 35 ("Rule 35"), which explicitly authorizes en banc courts to
resolve conflicts between decisions, although panels are not so authorized.
This argument at best justifies only one part of the interpanel rule: the in-
ability of a panel to overrule precedent. It does not support the other con-
clusion: namely, that panels are bound by such precedent. In any event,
Rule 35's authorization of en banc courts to resolve conflicts does not sup-
port the interpanel rule. If the interpanel rule were valid, there would be no
conflicts and no need for en banc courts to have authority to resolve them.
7. United States v. Walling, 936 F.2d 469, 472 (10th Cir. 1991); Capital Produce Co. v.
United States, 930 F.2d 1077, 1078 (4th Cir. 1991); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 53
n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 406 (1990); Greenhow v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
863 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1988); Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395, 400 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 823
F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied
sub non. Cohen v. United States, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Alexander v. Chevron, U.S.A., 806 F.2d
526, 529 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Lacy v. Gardino, 791 F.2d 980, 985
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 888 (1986); Humane Society of United States v. United States
Envtl. Protection Agency, 790 F.2d 106, 110 & n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1986); General Dynamics Corp. v.
United States, 773 F.2d 1224, 1225 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 239
(1987); Julius v. Johnson, 755 F.2d 1403, 1404 (11th Cir. 1985), afid on habeas corpus proceeding,
875 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 971 (1989); Meeks v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R.,
738 F.2d 748, 751 (6th Cir. 1984).
8. See United States v. Rosciano, 499 F.2d 173, 176 nn.2 & 4 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)
(pointing out this practice of the Seventh Circuit in Moody v. United States, 497 F.2d 359, 365 n.7
(7th Cir. 1974)); United States v. Miller, 495 F.2d 362, 366 n.3 (7th Cir. 1974).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 422 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1666 (1992); Deleski v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 819 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Adamson, 665 F.2d 649, 656 & n.19 (1 1th. Cir.), rehg denied, 700 F.2d 953 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983); In re Jaylaw Drug, Inc., 621 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. Fast v. School Dist., 728 F.2d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 1984); Ford v. General Motors Corp.,
656 F.2d 117, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[W]e note that the task of reexamining and overruling
panel decisions is left to the full Court, sitting en banc.").
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In addition to lacking a firm basis, the interpanel rule is at least implic-
itly inconsistent with Rule 35,11 with the statute authorizing panels,12 and
with statutes creating appeals as of right. 3 These three inconsistencies are
examined in Part II. If the interpanel rule is flawed by being contrary to
these statutes, one would expect to find evidence that the rule does not work
in practice in the cases that apply or attempt to apply it. Part III considers
that evidence. Part IV suggests three alternatives to replace the interpanel
rule.
II. STATUTORY BASES FOR QUESTIONING THE INTERPANEL RULE
In this Part, the interpanel rule is tested for consistency with Rule 35,
with the statute authorizing panels, and with statutes creating appeals as of
right. The interpanel rule is inconsistent with all three statutes. Adjust-
ments must be made in either the interpanel rule or in the three statutes.
Modifying the interpanel rule would primarily affect judicial administration
by increasing the number of en banc decisions. Courts of appeals them-
selves could make the change by repudiating the interpanel rule. In con-
trast, if the statutes were amended, fundamental legal theory would have to
be altered, which would require action by courts and Congress. Conse-
quently, the interpanel rule, not the statutes, should be modified.
A. The Interpanel Rule Is Inconsistent with Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 35.
Under Rule 35(a), only two conditions permit a hearing or rehearing en
banc. One condition is "when consideration by the full court is necessary to
secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions.""4 This language anticipates
a lack of uniformity within the circuits. In adopting this rule, the Supreme
11. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are not statutes. However, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1988) expressly authorizes the Supreme Court to "enact" these rules. They are codified at 28
U.S.C. For convenience, they will be included in the discussion of statutes in Part II of this
Article.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1988).
13. These include 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) regarding final decisions of district courts and
many other statutes that grant parties the right to appeal final actions of federal agencies. Exam-
ples of these latter statutes are § 7006(a) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6976(a) (1988), and § 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1988). For
convenience, all such statutes will be grouped and considered as a single unit in this Article.
14. FED. R. App. P. 35(a)(2).
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Court expected panels to develop inconsistent law and even specified the
procedure for resolving such inconsistencies.15
By establishing the interpanel rule as law, the courts of appeals have
subverted the intent of the Supreme Court in two ways, one substantive and
the other procedural. The substantive conflict is that the interpanel rule
forecloses the possibility of inconsistent decisions within a circuit. This is
contrary to Rule 35, which indicates that panels have the power to reject
panel precedent in the circuit. Although the Supreme Court recognized
that panels have the judicial power to reject panel precedent, the courts of
appeals, through the interpanel rule, deny the existence of such power.
The procedural deviation from the Supreme Court's intent is that the
courts of appeals have developed their own rule for resolving conflicting
intracircuit panel precedent. The court-made rule states that if a panel's
decision is inconsistent with the previous decision of a panel in the same
circuit, the later decision is not the law; it is invalid.16 This rule mandates
that there be no inconsistent interpanel decisions in a circuit. Inconsisten-
cies are aborted at conception. The Supreme Court, in Rule 35(a), foresaw
that such inconsistencies would arise and provided a mechanism for resolv-
ing them, but did not require that they be resolved. If the Court, acting
with the express authority of Congress, had intended no inconsistent in-
terpanel decisions in a circuit, it would have required en banc resolutions or
provided some other procedure to assure consistency.
B. The Interpanel Rule Is Inconsistent with the Statute Authorizing
Panels
The interpanel rule not only prohibits each panel in a given circuit from
overruling other panels' decisions, it also forbids a panel from overruling its
own decisions.17 Thus, for circuit panels, the doctrine of stare decisis takes
15. See, e.g., 9 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 235.02 n.3 (2d ed.
1992) ("The function of the in bane hearing is important in resolving conflicting decisions within
the circuit ... ").
16. Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F.2d 456, 459 n.2 (5th Cir.), modified on denial of
reh'g, (5th Cir. 1992); Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
17. Although no case was found that addresses this point directly, this conclusion is inherent
in the interpanel rule itself when stated in the form that only an en bane court can overrule panel
precedent. See, e.g., Ford v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 117, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[W]e
note that the task of reexamining and overruling panel decisions is left to the full Court, sitting en
bane."); Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978) ("This panel, of course, is bound by
Sylvestri and cannot properly overrule it except by rehearing en bane."), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940
(1979); see also Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70, 72 ("In
theory, prior-panel rules permit panels to create binding precedent, which can be overruled only
by the entire court sitting en bane.").
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on an absoluteness that is contrary to the intent of that doctrine. Stare
decisis, as described by the Supreme Court, is "not an inexorable com-
mand""s and "not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest deci-
sion." 19 In the Supreme Court's formulation of the doctrine, courts not
only have the power to reject their previous holdings, they have an obliga-
tion to do so in some circumstances.20 Yet, under the interpanel rule,
panels have neither the power nor the obligation to deviate from their past
decisions.21
The statute22 creating the authority of panels to decide cases does not
hint that Congress intended to burden society with a set of handicapped
courts. The statute mandates that "cases" and "controversies" "shall be
heard and determined"23 by panels. The statute places no restrictions on
"heard and determined." No language in the statute implies that a funda-
mental property of stare decisis, the authority of a court to overrule its own
precedent, is to be changed. Such radical departure from stare decisis, an
integral part of the common law, would require a clear expression of Con-
gress's intent to change the judicial course. Not only is there no clear ex-
pression in the statute authorizing panels, there is no evidence of it at all.
The interpanel rule is simply court-made law that sharply contrasts with
the statute the courts are purporting to apply. The interpanel rule should
be rejected, and panels should be able to apply stare decisis in full measure
like all other courts.
C. The Interpanel Rule Is Inconsistent with Statutes That Create an
Appeal as of Right.
Courts of appeals are given "jurisdiction of appeals from all final deci-
sions of the district courts."12 4 That grant of jurisdiction,25 which is obliga-
tory for the courts of appeals, creates a right to have the courts of appeals
18. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
19. Id. at 2609-10 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
20. See, ag., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2813 (1992) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.) ("[T]he decision to reexamine Plessy was... not only justified
but required."); Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2618 (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing two important ex-
amples of the Court applying this process).
21. The strongest evidence of this proposition is that no court stating the interpanel rule has
noted an exception for its own precedent. See cases cited supra note 7; see also supra note 17.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1988).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
25. This applies to all parties in a civil case, defendants in criminal cases, and the government
regarding certain issues in criminal cases.
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exercise the jurisdiction.26 The interpanel rule, however, depreciates this
right.
A right to have a court exercise its jurisdiction means a right to have the
court exercise its judicial power. That is the meaning of jurisdiction. The
judicial power of a court includes the authority to reject its own prece-
dent.27 Thus, when a party with a right to an appeal goes before a panel
encumbered with the interpanel rule, that party's right is curtailed.
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT THE INTERPANEL RULE IS INVALID
Just because a legal doctrine has exceptions does not render the doctrine
invalid. However, as the number of exceptions increases, confidence in the
doctrine declines. Moreover, if the exceptions are necessary to avoid con-
flicts between the doctrine and very fundamental legal principles, the doc-
trine is questioned even further. As the discussion of the exceptions to the
interpanel doctrine will show, the interpanel doctrine contains both of these
symptoms, which makes its legal validity questionable.
Some exceptions to the interpanel rule, although very narrow and pre-
cise, implicate fundamental questions of judicial power. In this category are
the cases in which a panel is confronted with a ruling by a prior panel that
would vest jurisdiction in the panel when none exists. The dilemma facing
the court is whether to follow the interpanel rule and allow a court to create
jurisdiction or to engage in "soft rejection" of the rule: that is, find an ex-
ception and respect the jurisdictional boundaries created by Congress.
An example of this dilemma and how it can be resolved is found in
Hayes v. United States Government Printing Office.28 The issue in Hayes
was the jurisdiction of the court of appeals in a mixed-motive2 9 appeal from
the Merit System Protection Board. An earlier motions panel found juris-
diction; the later merits panel refused to be bound by that holding.3 ° The
inability to revisit that question would have been at odds with the court's
basic power to decide whether it had jurisdiction, and questions of jurisdic-
26. "Ordinarily the conferral of jurisdiction without mention of discretion to decline to exer-
cise it has been construed to make the exercise of jurisdiction obligatory. Read this way, § 1291
confers on persons aggrieved by a final decision of the district court a right to review by the court
of appeals." 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 15, 110.05.
27. See United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Reinhardt &
Nelson, JJ., concurring) (discussing differences between courts of appeals and the Supreme Court
in applying stare decisis).
28. 684 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
29. A mixed-motive case is one in which a federal employee "raises allegations both of dis-
crimination and of insufficient evidence to support the agency decision of [poor performance or
misconduct]."
30. Hayes, 684 F.2d at 138 n.1.
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tion can be considered at any stage of a proceeding. The same reasoning
has been applied when, after a panel grants interlocutory appeal, 31 a later
panel concludes that the decision was incorrect and amounted to the panel
creating jurisdiction.32
A second narrow exception arises when en banc review of a panel's deci-
sion is not possible. In these cases, a later panel is not bound by the earlier
panel's decision. An example of this exception is North Carolina Utilities
Commission v. Federal Communications Commission.33 In this Fourth Cir-
cuit case, all but one of the active judges of the court were disqualified, and
thus en banc review was not possible. The court, which included two
judges from the Fifth Circuit sitting by designation, held that when the
interpanel rule would deny the parties the right to even the possibility of a
review of panel precedent, a right guaranteed by statute, the interpanel rule
must yield.34
Courts chafing under the strain of the interpanel rule also use a broader
and more malleable exception, the "intervening change" exception. This
exception provides that if an intervening, controlling change in the law oc-
curs after a panel decides an issue, a later panel is not bound by the earlier
panel's decision. The intervening change can be caused by the en banc
court,35 the Supreme Court,36 Congress,37 or an authoritative state court or
legislature when that state's law is controlling. 38
Intervening changes in the law often are within the discretion of
the hearing court. A panel faced with precedent it believes is wrong
almost certainly can weave a complex argument that points to some
shift in the intervening law.39 Gresham Park Community Organization v.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
32. Ray v. Edwards, 725 F.2d 655, 658 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984).
33. 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert denied sub nom. AT&T v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
34. Id. at 1044-45.
35. Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 908-09 (11th
Cir. 1990).
36. See, e.g., Footman v. Singletary, 978 F.2d 1207, 1211 (1 th Cir. 1992) ("We may decline
to follow a decision of a prior panel if necessary to give full effect to a United States Supreme
Court decision."); Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1107 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
326 (1991); Adamson v. Lewis, 955 F.2d 614, 620 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (referring to a collection of
cases so holding), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015 (1992).
37. United States v. Woodard, 938 F.2d 1255, 1258 (1lth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1210 (1992).
38. Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 936 F.2d 571 (5th
Cir. 1991).
39. Unfortunately, using complexity to obscure questionable reasoning was not beyond even
Justice Marshall. Jerry J. Phillips, Marbury v. Madison and Section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act,
60 TENN. L. REV. 51, 52 (1992) ("The reasoning on this issue, which is central to the outcome of
1993]
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Howell' illustrates how far panels will stretch to escape panel precedent
that they consider in error. The plaintiffs in Gresham Park sought an in-
junction under federal civil rights law41 to prohibit the enforcement of an
injunction issued by a Georgia state court. The panel in Gresham Park was
faced with clear panel precedent from Brown v. Chastain.42 In that case, the
panel held that the district court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the state
court's order.43 The Gresham Park panel acknowledged that Brown was
consistent with a "line of the Fifth Circuit cases"" and that Brown had
been followed by other panels.45 Using questionable legal analysis, the
panel avoided precedent. The panel developed two arguments for not fol-
lowing Brown, but neither argument is persuasive.
The panel's first effort to avoid Brown involved the claim that Brown
was implicitly inconsistent with two later Supreme Court cases, Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd.,4 6 and Juidice v. Vail,47 which applied the abstention doctrine.
The panel premised that if the Supreme Court abstains from hearing a case,
it must have had jurisdiction to hear the case.48 That premise is highly
questionable. Perhaps neither the parties nor the Court raised the issue of
jurisdiction. In Califano v. Sanders,49 the Court considered the issue of a
court deciding the merits without considering jurisdiction. In Califano, the
court held that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was not an in-
dependent basis for jurisdiction. 0 The Court referred to previous cases it
had decided in which jurisdiction had been assumed to exist under the
APA, although the issue had not been considered.5 It is simply not univer-
sally true that a court must have had jurisdiction if it decides a case or if it
the case, is as confusing and convoluted as any to be found in constitutional law. One suspects
Marshall of intentionally confusing the issue, to obscure the weakness of his reasoning.") (footnote
omitted).
40. 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
42. 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970).
43. Gresham Park, 652 F.2d at 1234 ("Under Brown, the district court here would have no
jurisdiction over GPCO's suit to enjoin the enforcement of the state court order.").
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1234 n.14.
46. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
47. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
48. Gresham Park, 652 F.2d at 1234.
49. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-706 (1988).
50. 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
51. Id. "Three decisions of this Court arguably have assumed, with little discussion, that the
APA is an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. However, an Act of Congress enacted
since our grant of certiorari in this case now persuades us that the better view is that the APA is
not to be interpreted as an implicit grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to review agency actions."
Id. (citations omitted).
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decides to abstain. The argument in Gresham Park based on that assump-
tion is grounded on a false premise and therefore leads to an invalid
conclusion.
Gresham Park's second argument to circumvent Brown asserted that
later cases in the Fifth Circuit departed from Brown. The panel cited Henry
v. First National Bank (Henry 1)52 and Henry v. First National Bank (Henry
11)" as departing from Brown. The weakness in this argument is that these
cases should have been invalid under the interpanel rule because they were
decided after Brown and were required to follow Brown. 4 To avoid the
error it perceived in Brown, the panel in Gresham Park should have faced
squarely the interpanel rule, which appeared to make Brown binding. In-
stead, the panel constructed complex arguments based on dubious premises.
Ironically, it also relied on decisions that ignored the interpanel rule, as it
strove to show that it did not have to ignore the rule.
Another exception to the interpanel rule based on serious or egregious
errors allows panels even more opportunity to avoid the interpanel rule. Of
course, the later panel will decide whether the earlier panel precedent was
erroneous and, if so, whether the error was serious enough to warrant rejec-
tion. This is a prescription for rule-swallowing if ever there was one.
Panels have been willing to follow the prescription. An example of this
willingness is Tucker v. Phyfer.55 While panel precedent controlled the out-
come in Tucker, the earlier decision failed to mention a controlling
Supreme Court decision that would have determined the outcome.56 Con-
sequently, the later panel felt free to reject the earlier panel's holding. 7
Courts have also developed the manifest injustice rule, a more generic
rule based on the "egregious error" exception. Under this exception, the
later panel is free to re-examine the issue if following panel precedent would
cause manifest injustice.58 The later panel, of course, determines whether
following precedent would result in manifest injustice.
If unable to find an intervening change in the law or rationalize a finding
of egregious error or manifest injustice, a panel has a final escape valve from
52. 444 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied sub. nomL Henry v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
405 U.S. 1019 (1972).
53. 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub. nom. Claiborne Hardware Co. v. Henry,
444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
54. See supra text accompanying note 16.
55. 819 F.2d 1030 (1lth Cir. 1987).
56. Id. at 1035 n.7.
57. Id.
58. See, eg., United States v. Fooladi, 746 F.2d 1027, 1033 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e see no
reason to conclude that the panel's ruling was 'manifest injustice.' "), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006
(1985).
1993]
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the interpanel rule. A panel can rely on the principle that all courts should
decide cases according to their reasoned view of the way the Supreme Court
would decide the case today, rather than limiting their function to mere
blind adherence to precedent.5 9 Panels quite rationally have concluded that
they, like all courts, have this power.6°
With the many exceptions, including some based on judicial discretion
and judgment, it is difficult to imagine a case that a panel could not exempt
from the interpanel rule.61 The interpanel rule is not a principle of law for
courts to follow, but an obstacle for them to avoid. It has been openly
ignored;62 its existence has been vigorously denied by a Senior Circuit Judge
of the Sixth Circuit;63 and it has been avoided by a 1982 finding that an
1891 case had been overruled sub silentio by an 1894 Supreme Court deci-
sion. 64 The interpanel rule is no longer conducive to coherent, reasoned
judgments, and it forces strained logic based on questionable premises and
nebulous implications in Supreme Court precedent. Such a state of affairs is
an obvious example of exceptions swallowing a rule. The interpanel rule has
lost its compulsion, its ability to bind panels, and is at best an alternative to
its expanding exceptions.
59. Cf Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987) ("We con-
clude that the courts of appeal should decide cases according to their reasoned view of the way
[the] Supreme Court would decide the pending case today.").
60. Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 124 & n.4 (Ist Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
(overruling precedent after circulating opinion to all active judges;, advised that this should be
done only sparingly and with extreme caution); Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth., 945 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that a panel can overrule panel precedent in
"those few instances in which newly emergent authority, although not directly controlling, never-
theless offers a convincing reason for believing that the earlier panel, in light of the neoteric devel-
opments, would change its course"), rev'd on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 684 (1993).
61. In the opinion of one chief judge, the more judges in a circuit, the less likely the interpanel
rule is to be applied. Tjoflat, supra note 17, at 72 ("As the monitoring burden grows with the size
of the court, jumbo court judges simply abandon their prior-panel rule implicitly, if not by
design.").
62. See, e.g., United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1979); Beasley v. United States, 491
F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); see also Tjoflat, supra note 17, at 70 ("[T]here are too many situations in
which three-judge panels, in their published opinions, have glossed over precedent or have disre-
garded it sub silentio, or in unpublished opinions, have decided cases plainly contrary to an estab-
lished rule of law.").
63. Speigner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (6th Cir. 1979) ("However, there is no rule in
this Circuit which requires an en banc hearing to overrule a decision of a three-judge panel."),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 1076 (1980).
64. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 626 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
PRECEDENTIAL FORCE OF PANEL LAW
IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO REPLACE THE INTERPANEL RULE
Discarding the interpanel rule is only half of the job; a replacement is
needed. Three alternatives are proposed in this Article for completing this
task. The first alternative would allow conflicting panel precedent in a cir-
cuit. The second and third alternatives would eliminate that possibility and
the legal uncertainty created by it.
The first alternative to replace the interpanel rule would permit a panel
to depart from, but not to overrule, prior panels' decisions. The amount of
weight or deference to be given to panel precedent would be for the courts
to decide by an evolutionary process. One possibility would be the standard
applied by federal district courts regarding intradistrict precedent: to follow
such precedent as a matter of comity except in unusual or exceptional
circumstances.65
If the alternative of freeing panels to accept or reject panel precedent
were adopted, circuits would have conflicting precedent. There would be
an increased need for en bane courts to exercise their authority to resolve
the conflicts and to maintain or achieve uniformity.66 In circumstances
likely to result in rehearings, circuit rules to guide the en bane courts
would inject more predictability into the system. This, in turn, would
greatly benefit the bar.
If the existence of conflicts and the increased docket of the court en
bane seem too steep a price for rejecting the interpanel rule, courts could
utilize a variation of this alternative and establish a senior panel to rehear
and resolve conflicts. 67
The second alternative that could replace the interpanel rule would
grant panels the authority to disregard intracircuit panel precedent, and
also the power to overrule it. As in the first proposal, the courts would
determine the weight panel precedent is to have. However, a decision in-
consistent with such precedent would overrule it. This approach is analo-
gous to the long-standing rule of the Supreme Court that when two of its
decisions are in conflict, the more recent one has the effect of overruling the
older one.68 This second alternative has the advantage of giving a high level
of certainty to the law in the circuits. It also would not increase the pres-
65. See supra note 6.
66. FED. R. App. P. 35(a).
67. Even under the interpanel rule, a panel can be authorized to overrule circuit precedent by
the full court and all active members. See United States v. Taylor, 828 F.2d 630, 633 (10th Cir.
1987).
68. Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409, 1416 (9th Cir. 1986) (basing rule on
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 517-20 (1976) and Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129, 132 (1888)).
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sure on en banc courts to rehear cases merely to achieve uniformity in the
circuit.
The courts of appeals could adopt either alternative without legislation.
The third, however, would require intervention of the Supreme Court to
change Rule 35. Under this approach, when a panel determines that con-
trolling panel precedent is wrong, it would certify the issue to the court en
banc. The court en banc would be required to hear and decide that issue.69
A variation of this model would authorize the court en banc to empower a
panel to resolve this issue. Either form of this third proposal would prevent
conflicting panel precedent in a circuit. The price for this certainty would
be an increased burden on the en banc court to hear more cases, a burden
that could be eliminated by the suggested variation.
V. CONCLUSION
The interpanel rule deprives panels of part of their judicial power, de-
nies parties a portion of their right of appeal, and dilutes the strength of the
Supreme Court's enactments. The courts have ambiguously and obliquely
eliminated the interpanel rule by creating a spiraling array of exceptions.
This has made reliance on the rule uncertain. The courts have rejected the
substance of the rule, but have left the facade standing. It is time to bring
that down, too. The judicial system would benefit if the courts of appeals
eliminated the rule decisively and directly.
The most reasonable replacement for the interpanel rule is the first alter-
native presented in Part IV. Under that model, panels would be freed from
the control of panel, but not en banc, precedent. This enhances the author-
ity of the panel hearing a case and thereby restores a major portion of the
parties' rights of appeal. It would also re-establish the duty of resolving
conflicts for en banc courts as envisioned by the Supreme Court. Neither of
the other two alternatives meets these boundary conditions as well as the
first, but either would be better than the current interpanel rule.
69. Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (The court en
banc had the power to determine what issues it would consider, and it could grant rehearing
limited to specific issues only.).
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